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hamid.jahankhani@uel.ac.uk 
 
Abstract: Identity and access management is rapidly becoming the top business issue as 
organizations look to increase security, reduce risk and decrease operational costs. In order to 
evaluate adequately the emerging maze of technologies brought forward by various 
vendors it is necessary to critically analyze many aspects of the identity related security 
terms and techniques. The emerging development of techniques assisting in the 
consolidation of dispersed yet somewhat related Identity components across the 
enterprise-wide systems could very well reduce the cost of management, while increasing 
the control over enforcement of governing Compliance and internal security policies. But 
as always there may be tradeoffs that could damage the organization if not planned 
properly. The fascinating fact is that Identity Management is 80% politics and business and 20% 
technology. Identity Management is a set of processes and supporting infrastructure for the 
creation, maintenance and use of digital identities (unique ids, attributes, credentials, entitlements. 
This paper aims to discuss what Identity Management means in the context of Information 
Technology and to provide an over view of the important components that makeup Identity 
Management Systems. 
 
1. Introduction: 
 
“Identity management solutions address 
enterprises' need to administer (create, 
modify and delete) user accounts, user 
profiles and corporate policies across the 
heterogeneous IT environment via a 
combination of user roles and business 
rules.”, (Gartner, 2003). 
Above Gartner Group refers to the 
technology as Identity Management (IdM) 
Solution. Oxford Computer Group an 
Identity Management Solution Providers 
defines Identity and Access Management 
(AIM) as; “A system of procedures, 
policies and technologies to manage the 
lifecycle and entitlements of digital 
identities. More simply, efficient and 
auditable mechanisms for ensuring the 
right people have access to the right 
resources at the right time”, (Abagnale, 
2006).  
In effect the emerging technology 
frequently referred to as “Identity 
Management” (IdM) and sometimes called 
“Identity and Access Management” (IAM) 
are a set of technologies that are aimed at 
improving the existing state of affairs 
surrounding creation, maintenance and 
eventually deleting Identity related 
credentials. 
The key question is; what are the 
improvements that IdM can bring to the 
existing state of affairs in relations to the 
Identity and its credentials? 
There are number of fascinating categories 
of improvements and advantages to gain 
by implementing the new technologies of 
IdM into the existing systems. The 
question is; Why do we need Identity 
Management Systems? 
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This paper aims to list the basic necessities 
of components that make up IdM systems 
as well as the elements that are meant to be 
effectively controlled by implementation 
of Identity Management Systems. For the 
purpose of this paper we shall consider 
users/employees/consumers (Human) 
rather than resources or services as Digital 
Identities in the system. 
 
2. Identity Management 
components and Services: 
 
The emerging technologies of IdM shall 
much more effectively create new Digital 
Identity(ies) and manage the Identity 
Lifecycle in an Automated fashion known 
as Provisioning and if no longer needed 
De-Provision such an Identity. 
The whole purpose of using Identity & 
Access Management Systems is to be able 
to exert maximum amount of desired 
Governance Compliance and Corporate 
Policies, with minimum Human 
Intervention whilst ensuring to keep track 
of (Auditing) all changes and activities 
throughout the enterprise and beyond if 
necessary in order to achieve highest level 
of cost saving while maintain and highest 
level of Security within the entire system 
that may span across a Federated Identity 
Managed (FIM) environment. 
IdM Systems access EDS (Enterprise 
Directory Services) in order to Identify, 
Authenticate and Authorize users for 
various purposes. Today’s EDS based 
systems mostly are based on LDAP 
Version 3. Adequate IdM systems must 
have support for X.500 (Global White 
Pages directory). One of the selection 
criteria’s for IDM Systems must be its 
wide range of compatibility with Systems 
& applications Databases, Flat Files etc 
that they use as Repositories of Users’ 
Credentials for Reference Monitoring 
within Silos of Dissimilar and 
Heterogeneous information systems. 
Examples of EDS (Enterprise Directory 
Services) are Microsoft Active Directory, 
Novell eDirectory, Oracle Internet 
Directory (ODI), and IBM Directory 
Services (LDAP), and Sun LDAP-based 
Directory Service part of Sun Java 
Enterprise. 
Most implementation of IdM Systems is 
likely to interact with Active Directory a 
Microsoft's proprietary implementation of 
an LDAP-compliant directory service. Of 
course other proprietary alternatives EDS 
such as Oracle Internet Directory may be 
used. There are also plenty of open-source 
tools to create directory services, including 
OpenLDAP and the Kerberos (protocol). 
However the core components of IdM 
environment in most cases is provided by 
amalgamation of information available 
from all Reference Monitoring 
Repositories mentioned above into a 
separate MetaDirectory or Virtual 
Directory under the total control of IdM 
System. Almost always the user shall 
receive a Unique Identifier (This may be 
supplied by HR as Employee number or 
Student Number, Social Security number 
or generated by the system) across the 
entire enterprise in order not to clash with 
any previously specified Identity. 
Of course adequately designed IdM 
systems may systematically allow 
bidirectional access and possible changes 
into their MetaDirectory for scenarios 
where changes in part of the system that 
may not necessarily use the IdM 
management interfaces be allowed to be 
captured into the global MetaDirectory in 
order to reflect those changes into the 
wider system. There are heavy penalties to 
pay should the highest level of attention 
lapse when designing the control of the 
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bidirectional changes of the 
MetaDirectory. 
Data Feeds and Connectors are used to 
transfer data between dissimilar systems, 
applications etc. Data being transferred 
through these Connectors include 
configuration information, request for 
Identification, Authentication & 
Authorization etc. The type of information 
going through the Data Feeds and 
Connectors would be limited by the 
capabilities available in the IdM software 
and any IdM intended Standards that may 
apply particularly in a Federated Identity 
management Environment. Attribute and 
Group Services is via a combination of 
user roles and business rules and Support 
Software Systems (logs, maintenance web 
pages, diagnostic tools, etc.). 
Segregation of duties are also achieved 
through Workflow in as many aspects as 
the vendors and Solution Providers 
imagination and expertise can provide for 
the specific needs of the end users with as 
much granularity as they are capable of or 
required by their clients. 
Enforced and Automated Auditing is 
another extremely valuable part of all 
adequate Identity Management Systems in 
order to keep tracks of changes to the 
system and any Authorization or failure. 
Identity Management also includes such 
components as SSO (Single Sign On) 
which in effect  allows the user to provide 
one password for all chosen systems, 
Applications and services etc within the 
Identity Managed environment to avoid 
having to remember and reenter many 
different passwords every time the user 
may require access to his/her Authorized 
resources and services. 
Of course the Identity Management 
Systems may go further to challenge the 
issues that matter within the entire IT 
infrastructure in a much wider, perhaps 
global scale. These are contrasting issues 
combining highly desired Security & 
responsibility within the Identity 
Management space.  
This is then referred to as Federated 
Identity Management (FIM). 
FIM in turn demands strict Standards for 
interoperability amongst dissimilar and 
distributed Identity Management systems, 
there are number of standards such as 
Shibboleth, SAML (Security Assertion 
Markup Language), SPML (Security 
Provisioning Markup Language) etc, with 
number of organizations involved such as 
Liberty Alliance & OASIS etc. 
Security goals are usually acronymic to 
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Accountability. 
However the need has never been greater 
to add ‘Anonymity’ amongst the goals. 
In fact all the above goals play an 
important part of a well thought IdM 
architecture. Identity could include many 
attributes of an individual. For example; 
 
• Confidentiality is essential when you 
trust your Credit Card details with an 
online merchant 
 
• Integrity of say data held by Health 
Authorities for your state of health is 
paramount should you need to receive 
treatment or purchase Insurance 
 
• Accountability is the key to hold 
responsible anyone dealing with your 
sensitive Identity orientated 
information 
 
• Anonymity is an issue raised time and 
time again when someone’s Identity 
being exposed to others can have 
catastrophic results. 
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3. Relationship between Identity & 
Authentication: 
Let’s start by looking at the definitions and 
analyses concerning the core security 
principles required to adequately identify 
and authenticate a user into an identity 
managed system. 
Identity 
A security principal (you or a computer, 
typically) wants to access a system. 
Because the system doesn’t know you yet, 
you need to make a declaration of who you 
are. Your answer to the question “Who are 
you” is the first thing you present to a 
system when you want to use it. Some 
common examples of identity are user IDs, 
digital certificates (which include public 
keys), and ATM cards. A notable 
characteristic of identity is that it is public, 
and it has to be this way: identity is your 
claim about yourself, and you make that 
claim using something that’s publicly 
available, (Riley, 2006). 
Authentication 
This is the answer to the question “OK, 
how can you prove it?” When you present 
your identity to a system, the system wants 
you to prove that it is indeed you and not 
someone else. The system will challenge 
you, and you must respond in some way. 
Common authenticators include 
passwords, private keys, and PINs. 
Whereas identity is public, authentication 
is private: it’s a secret known (presumably) 
only by you. In some cases, like 
passwords, the system also knows the 
secret. In other cases, like PKI, the system 
doesn’t need to possess the secret, but can 
validate its authenticity (this is one of 
many reasons why PKI is superior). Your 
possession of this secret is what proves 
that you are who you claim to be, (Riley, 
2006). 
Authorization 
Once you’ve successfully authenticated 
yourself to a system, the system controls 
which resources you’re allowed to access. 
Typically this is through the use of a token 
or ticket mechanism. The token or ticket 
constrains your ability to roam freely 
throughout the system. By “caching” your 
authenticated identity for subsequent 
access control decisions, it allows you to 
access only that which the administrators 
have determined is necessary, thus 
enforcing the principle of least privilege. 
Authorization is usually not an area of 
confusion, although this may be 
challenged on the point that some security 
attributes may be lost if a resource such as 
a file was to be replicated across dissimilar 
systems particularly in a heterogeneous 
enterprise-wide environment where IdM 
systems usually play their part. 
There is a trend in merging identity and 
authentication. This is worrying many 
researchers, as it is believed that identity 
and authentication must remain distinct. 
(Riley, 2006) has highlighted this by three 
different scenarios. 
Scenario 1: 
“Consider a system that has no passwords. 
You log on by entering only your user ID. 
This works fine, I suppose, if you’re the 
only user of the system and if no one else 
can get to it. How about a multi-user 
system or a network? 
Someone else could simply enter your user 
ID and get access to your information. 
Generally, user IDs are also e-mail 
addresses, so you can’t rely on the fact that 
user IDs are secret. Also, what happens if 
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two people have the same name? How will 
you create unique environments for each 
person?” 
Scenario 2: 
“Consider a system that requires entering 
only a password -- no user ID -- to log on. 
Passwords are secret and they’re not acting 
as e-mail addresses, so this should work, 
right? Well, if your password now serves 
double duty -- identifying you and 
authenticating you -- then problems arise. 
Say you’re changing your password to 
“p4ssw0rd” and, unknown to you, 
someone else has already decided to use 
that password. You can’t use it! Indeed, 
the system will probably raise an error: 
“That password is already in use. Please 
try another.” What have you just learned? 
The password to someone else’s account 
of course! Now you can be a bad guy. 
Actually, there are no real-world systems 
that attempt to use passwords as 
identifiers; however there are papers 
describing how a system without user IDs 
is a really great idea. Obviously, ones 
disagree. 
Scenario 3: 
“A system must maintain distinct 
mechanisms for identity and 
authentication. Identity must be unique: 
there can be only one “jsmith” in the 
system or domain (but not necessarily in 
the world). Authenticators, however, don’t 
have to be unique -- only secret. Both 
“jsmith” and “mjones” could be using the 
same password, but neither of them knows 
this. Having such a public/private pair 
(hmm, “public/private,” sounds familiar, 
doesn’t it?) also makes it easier to address 
theft. In this system, if a bad guy learns 
your password, you just change it. You 
don’t need to go through the hassle of 
getting a brand new account. You can 
revoke and reassign passwords as often as 
you wish. How would an ID-only or 
password-only system handle that 
situation?”. 
Identity and authentication are distinct 
components of the steps necessary to use a 
secure computer system. Identity without 
authentication lacks proof; authentication 
without identity invalidates auditing and 
eliminates multi-user capability (consider 
Windows 95/98, which supported a 
password as an authenticator but no user 
ID). If biometrics becomes important to 
you as you begin considering how to 
strengthen identity and authentication in 
your security strategy, remember to 
evaluate how a particular biometric 
implementation views itself. Proper 
biometrics are identity only and will be 
accompanied, like all good identifiers, by a 
secret of some kind -- a PIN, a private key 
on a smart card, or even a password, 
(OASIS, 2006), (Oxford Group, 2006) and 
(Abagnale, 2006). 
Consider biometrics, given the definitions 
and characteristics of identity and 
authentication, which is biometrics: 
identity or authentication? 
Before answering the question, think about 
the attributes of biometrics. Is it public or 
private? Public, of course. You leave 
various biometrics everywhere you go -- 
your fingerprints remain on anything you 
touch, your face is stored in countless 
surveillance systems, your retina patterns 
are known at least by your optometrist, 
perhaps. And it’s believed, although there 
is no actual evidence to support the claim, 
that biometrics are unique. Given this, it 
follows that biometrics are identity, not 
authentication. 
Problems arise when systems begin using 
biometrics for authentication. Say that all 
you need to do is swipe your finger to log 
on, with no additional factors. Your 
fingerprint is now serving both to identify 
you and to prove that you are you. How 
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can such a system be compromised? Very 
easily, it turns out, without a secret 
accompanying your fingerprint. Numerous 
research reports have shown that biometric 
systems can be spoofed (the most 
notorious of which involves the assistance 
of a Gummi Bear; (Putte, 2002) and 
(Schneider, 2002). 
Another sobering example: “Police in 
Malaysia are hunting for the members of a 
violent gang who chopped off a car 
owner’s finger to get round the vehicle’s 
hi-tech security system”, (Kent, 2005). 
Again, because no secret accompanies the 
finger, all you need is the finger and you 
can possess the car. Here the security 
countermeasure moves the risk from the 
car to the driver! This is when security 
becomes unsafe. Revocation presents 
another challenge. If a system relies only 
on a biometric for both identity and 
authentication, how do you revoke that 
factor? Forgotten passwords can be 
changed; lost smartcards can be revoked 
and replaced. How do you revoke a finger? 
4. Federated Identity Management 
(FIM) 
Federated Identity Management is the 
result of Identity Management Systems 
cooperating amongst multiple 
organizational boundaries. When Identity 
management implementation encompasses 
multiple organization boundaries, it is 
considered as Federated Identity 
Management. Identity related data are also 
likely to cross dissimilar Identity 
Management Systems, which adds further 
technical complications beside the usual 
Trust & Security stronghold in this area of 
discussions. 
Other obstacles include how two 
companies that want to federate will merge 
their information. The question that arises 
is that; what can Identity Federation do for 
you?, (Kirk, 2005). 
• Provide your customers, citizens, 
employees, and business partners 
more control over identity 
information 
• Supply superior security, control, 
and privacy-improving trust 
• Mitigate against breaches and 
identity theft with no single point-
of-failure 
• Provision accounts and securely 
provide access to designated 
resources both within and outside 
corporate borders 
• Build identity into the foundation 
of all transactions and personal data 
services activities 
• Eliminate excess passwords and 
securely implement single sign-on 
• Offer a far more satisfactory online 
experience, and new levels of 
personalization 
• Create seamless and secure 
business relationships 
• Improve authentication with 
existing internal resources 
• Improve shareholder value and 
compliance procedures by offering 
a means for better reporting 
accuracy 
• Reduce risk through a more 
balanced authentication process 
 
The relationships between the existing 
standards of FIM and the dynamism of the 
FIM environment are highlighted below: 
? Federation continues to be a growing 
segment of the identity management 
market 
o Many different use cases are 
appropriate for federation 
? The market is providing a wide range 
of products that support federation 
standards 
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o Web access management 
(WAM)and standalone federation 
products lead the way 
? Interoperability, conformance, and 
coexistence of the various protocols is 
a potential issue for enterprises 
o Vendors attempt to address this in 
product implementations 
The diagram below shows the 
compatibility between different standards 
as well as any backward compatibility, 
(Gebel, 2005). 
 
 
 
Federation standards family tree and interoperability, Source, (Gebel, 2005) 
Twelve vendors plus Internet2 demonstrated how federated identity implementations 
could interoperate in a mixed environment that included Security Assertions Markup 
Language (SAML), Liberty Alliance Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF), 
Shibboleth, WS-Federation, WS-Security, and WS-Trust protocols. Although the 
participants demonstrated interoperability for basic functions like single sign-on 
(SSO), there are limitations because functionality differs between protocols or even 
between different versions of the same protocol. 
 
The Federated Identity Management is still 
evolving and the standards and 
applications are yet to mature. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Preparation is the Key for successful IdM 
implementation. Segregation of duties 
could be a key. It is not a one-man task and 
it’s not for the faint of heart. Collective 
decisions must be made at very high level 
by CXO’s and stakeholders. 
It is very easy to fall in the trap of coming 
across just another Technology, Platform, 
Approach, Standard, Protocol, additional 
Tool, Compliance, Governance, Industry 
ID-FF 1.1 
SAML 1.0 SAML 1.1 
Shibboleth 1.x 
ID-FF 1.2 
SAML 2.0 
Shibboleth 2.0 
(4Q2005) 
WS-Fed 
Passive interop profile 
SSO interop profile 
SSO MEX 
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Regulation or Best Practices or Ethical 
issue that would impact your Technical 
Architecture, Implementation Plan, 
Compliance or Morals. 
Therefore a collective and very calculated 
decision must be made to avoid having to 
go back to the drawing board in the middle 
of a very long project or ending up with 
massive expenditure that results in liability 
rather than a success at the end of it all. 
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